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Keenan: Self-Incrimination

TO ACT OR NOT? THAT IS THE QUESTION:
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE SOLE
PROPRIETOR

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that a sole proprietor is being criminally prosecuted by
the government. She has a series of documents in her possession
that incriminate her based upon the charges brought by the
government. The government has issued a subpoena duces tecum
requesting that these incriminating documents, in existence prior
to the issuance of the subpoena, be turned over.
In light of the Supreme Court's latest pronouncements
regarding the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, 1 and the circuit courts' interpretation of those
pronouncements, how would she fare in claiming this privilege?
The matter is hardly well-settled, but the issues may be
illuminated through an investigation into the various arguments
the sole proprietor may raise. This Comment will examine the
2
historical background leading up to the current state of the law,
the possible outcomes of a defense that asserts the right to
protection of the subpoenaed material's contents, 3 and finally,

1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent

part: "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " Id.
2. See infra notes 5-33 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 34-74 and accompanying text.
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will investigate the merits of the argument that production itself is
4
incriminating and, accordingly, should not be compelled.
L BACKGROUND

The privilege against self-incrimination originated in the
common law procedures and ecclesiastical courts, 5 probably in
reaction to abusive policies carried out by the courts of the Star

Chamber and the High Commission. Previously, the defendant's
primary procedural safeguard was the right to speak on his own

behalf, 6 without the assistance of counsel. 7 As the system
evolved from inquisitorial to adversarial, lawyers sought to
exclude those statements 8 of their clients that would bolster

9
prosecutors' case through self-incrimination.

By the end of the seventeenth century, the privilege had

successfully taken hold in the American courts. 10 The Fifth
Amendment was introduced as one of the proposed Constitutional
amendments during the first session of Congress in 1789, by then
Representative James Madison. 11 Adopted into the Bill of Rights,
the
Amendment
provides
that
"no
person shall

4. See infra notes 75-119 and accompanying text.
5. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ON TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2250, at 269 (John T. M'Naughton ed., 1961).
6. 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047 (1994).
7. Id. at 1049.
8. Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views As To
Application Of Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination To
Compulsory Production Of Documents, 48 L. Ed. 2d 852, 855 (1977)
(revisiting the desire of the early courts to hear an admission of guilt from the
defendant's own lips).
9. Eben Moglen, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1130 (1994).
10. See WIGMORE, supra note 5, at 292; George T. Felkenes,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 283 (2d ed. 1988).
11. Daniel E. Will, "DearDiary - Can You Be Used Against Me?": The
Fifth Amendment and Diaries, 35 BOSTON C. L. REV. 965, 969 (1994) (citing
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
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be .... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ...
"12
The purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination is said to
be no less than the preservation of the adversarial system of
justice itself. 13 A sense of fair play and balance in the stateindividual relation requires that the government, by its own
labors, bear the full weight of evidence production in a criminal
prosecution. 14 As it developed, the privilege was understood to
prohibit evidentiary searches which relied on torture or other
forms of coercion.15 Various forms of coerced testimony have
been endorsed or disallowed through the history of the Republic,
but for the purposes of this Comment, we need only consider
coercion through the use of a subpoena duces tecum. 16 The
Supreme Court has ruled that compulsion to testify by means of
such a subpoena is sufficiently coercive to require protection
17
under the Fifth Amendment.
The parameters of the privilege against self-incrimination began
to emerge slowly in the United States. 18 The seminal case of
Boyd v. United States19 defined the Supreme Court's construction

V, cl. 3.
13. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).
12. U.S. CONST. amend.

14. Rydstrom, supra note 9, at 857.
15. Moglen, supranote 10, at 1129.

16. A subpoena duces tecunz is "a court process, initiated by a party in
litigation, compelling production of certain specific documents and other
items, material and relevant to facts in issue in a pending judicial proceeding,
which documents are in custody and control of person or body served with
process." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1426 (6th ed. 1990).

17. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976) In accord,
New York State endorses the view that legal compulsion is a sufficient basis
for invoking this privilege. People v. Sobotker, 61 N.Y.2d 44, 47. 459 N.E.
187, 189, 471 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (1984). In New York, the use of a subpoena
to force testimony from a reluctant witness satisfies the requirement that the
testimonial communication be compelled. Matter of Vanderbilt 57 N.Y.2d 66,
78, 439 N.E.2d 378, 385, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 669 (1982).
18. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

19. Id.
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of both the Fourth20 and Fifth Amendments 21 as general
protectors of privacy and private information. 22 The mutual
reliance on and comparison between the two amendments has

abated with time2 3 thus their similarities will not be examined
here other than parenthetically. Despite the flaws perceived by
later Justices, Boyd dominated the Fifth Amendment discussion
24
until quite recently.
Clause ascended to
Although the Self-Incrimination

Constitutional stature in 1789, it was nearly one hundred years
before the Supreme Court would find occasion to bring the clause
within sustained focus. 25 In Boyd, the Court examined the

constitutionality

of statutes which required

defendants in

forfeiture actions to produce incriminating evidence regarding the
items subject to forfeiture. 26 The items at issue were thirty-five
cases of polished plate glass which were allegedly subject to
import duties. 27 At trial, the district attorney was granted an
order, resembling a subpoena duces tecum, 2 8 directing the

defendants to produce an invoice for twenty-nine cases of glass
previously imported. 2 9 After complying with the order, under
protest, the defendants were found guilty of fraudulently
depriving the government of lawful duties. 30 After the circuit
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth amendment states in pertinent
part: "[tihe right of the people to be secure.., against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated . . . . " Id.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633 ("We have already
noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments. They throw great
light on each other ...we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a
man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.").
Id.
22. In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993).
23. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
24. Id.
25. Kate E. Bloch, Fifth Amendment Compelled Statements: Modeling the
Contours Of Their ProtectedScope, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1603, 1609 (1994).
26. Id.
27. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618.
28. Bloch, supra note 25, at 1609.
29. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618.
30. Id.
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court affirmed the judgment, certiorari was granted by the
31
Supreme Court.
The Court found that the action, though technically civil in
nature, was essentially a criminal prosecution for Fifth
Amendment purposes in that forfeiture was premised on a
violation of the law. 32 However, the Court held "that the Fifth
Amendment, combining with the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures, erected a
constitutional barrier to the compulsory production of
incriminating documents. " 33 Thus, any forcible and compulsory
extortion of a person's private papers, to be used as evidence in
an action in which he or she may be held criminally liable, was
34
found to be the equivalent of prohibited compelled testimony.
II. CONTENT ARGUMENT
The Court in Boyd extended protection from compelled
35
incrimination to a "man's private books and papers,"
absolutely and without exception. 36 Its' proposal that the
constitutional provision be "liberally construed" 37 for the
continued protection of personal rights has received something
less than a warm reception. In fact, the Court's own words
proved prescient as the ensuing interpretations unfolded:
31. Id.
32. Id. at 634 (noting that subsequent decisions have extended the scope of

Fifth Amendment privilege to "any judicial proceeding, civil or criminal,
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory"); See also Gordon E.
Hunt, Fifth Amendment Limitations on the Compelled Production of Evidence,
24 AM. CPiM. L. REv. 801, 802 (1987) (quoting Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 547, 562 (1972)). New York State recognizes as valid an assertion of
the privilege where criminal liability, including sanctions, may result from the
testimony. Anonymous Atty's v. Bar Ass'n of Erie Cty., 41 N.Y.2d 506, 510.
362 N.E.2d 592, 596, 393 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964 (1977).
33. Rydstrom, supra note 8, at 855-56.
34. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35.
35. Id. at 633.
36. Rydstrom, supra note 8, at 863 (noting that the invasion of the
indefeasible rights of personal security, personal liberty and private property
constitutes the essence of the violation).
37. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
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It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the
rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person
and property should be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and
leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
38
more in sound than in substance.
History chronicles a long line of decisions which limited the
protection enunciated by the Court in Boyd. 39 Accordingly, the
initial erosion of the broad Fifth Amendment protection foreseen
in Boyd involved corporate, partnership and labor union
documents and then, documents of a personal nature in the
possession of third parties. 40 The applicability of the privilege to
corporations was negatively ruled on, with the Court noting that
corporations were not guaranteed any constitutional rights. 4 1 A
corporate president could not refuse to produce corporate books
which established his criminal conduct. 42 A debtor could not
prevent evidentiary use of books and records, from which he or
she feared criminal charges might result, because the title and
possession of the books had passed to the receiver in

38. Id. at 635.
39. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); United
States v. John Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762-63 (1966); United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913);
Wilson v. United States, 228 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906);

40. Sharon Worthy-Bulla, An Analysis of In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum (United States v. Doe): Does the Fifth Amendment Protect the
Contents of PrivatePapers?, 15 PACE L. REv. 303, 312 (1994).
41. Id. at 310 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).

42. Rydstrom, supra note 8, at 858 (citing Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911)).
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bankruptcy. 43 A labor union official was held to have no
privilege to refuse to furnish union records sought by a grand
jury. 44 There, the Court explained that the protection of
individuals, rather than entities, was the purpose of the
privilege. 4 5 A taxpayer who had turned over her books and
records to her accountant could assert no Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled production of the books, the Court
reiterated that the privilege was personal, adhering to the person
but not the information that might incriminate her. 46 Possession
of a partnership's financial records in a representational capacity
compelled the Court to hold that the personal privilege was
inapplicable and production could be compelled under such
47
circumstances.
Fisher v. United States seriously eroded the scope of the Boyd
decision. 4 8 Declaring that "the prohibition against forcing the
production of private papers has long been a rule searching for a
rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth

Amendment against compelling a person to give 'testimony' that
incriminates him," 49 the Court held that a taxpayer's attorney
could be compelled to furnish tax records which were in the

attorney's possession without violating the taxpayer's Fifth
Amendment rights. Noting that "several of Boyd's express or
43. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913)), noted
for Justice Holmes' statement that "[a] party is privileged from producing the
evidence, but not from its production.").
44. Worthy-Bulla, supra note 40, at 313 (citing United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694 (1944)).
45. Id.

46. Rydstrom, supra note 8, at 859 (citing Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973)). New York State interprets the privilege similarly; only the
private property of the claimant, or property in her possession in a personal
capacity is protected. See People v. Doe, 90 A.D.2d 669, 455 N.Y.S.2d 866
(4th Dep't 1982).
47. Hunt, supra note 32, at 801 (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85, 92 (1974)) (denying the right of "collective entities," including any
"organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its
individual members," to assert the privilege).
48. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391(1976).
49. Id. at 409
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implicit declarations have not stood the test of time,,, 50 Justice
White's majority opinion found that the Fifth Amendment was
not designed to deal with privacy issues generally, but rather
within the confines of compelled self-incrimination. 5 1
Thus, the focus of the inquiry regarding the Fifth Amendment
privilege shifted from whether the contents of the documents are
privileged to whether production of the documents is a privileged
act. 52 The Court, however, noted that the act of producing
evidence in response to a subpoena had its own communicative
aspects, including tacit concession of the existence of the
papers. 53 Protection of privacy, it held, was to be found in other
sections of the Constitution, namely the First and Fourth
Amendments, and from evidentiary privileges such as the
attorney-client privilege. 54 Left unanswered was whether the
Fifth Amendment would shield the contents of private papers,
55
such as tax records privately held, from compelled production.
The Court further clarified its position in holding that the
seizure of an attorney's business records, and their subsequent
admission into evidence, did not violate his or her right against
compelled self-incrimination. 5 6 The seized records did not
compel the attorney's testimony because he neither aided in their
delivery nor was he forced to compile the records initially. 57 The

50. Id. at 407.
51. Id. at 400-01 ("We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose
from the moorings of its language, and make it serve as a general protector of

privacy - a word not mentioned in its text and a concept directly addressed in
the Fourth Amendment.").
52. Hunt, supra note 33, at 805.

53. Rydstrom, supra note 8, at 860.
54. Hunt, supra note 32, at 805. New York State case law reflects the shift
in focus from a contents-based inquiry, holding that the privilege does not
protect information, personal or private, per se. Matter of Vanderbilt 57
N.Y.2d 66, 78, 439 N.E.2d 378, 385, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 669, 6 (1982)
(citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976)).
55. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir.
1993).

56. Rydstrom, supra note 8, at 861
57. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976).
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focus of the analysis, the Court reasoned, rests solely on the
58
voluntariness of the communication.
The Court revisited the question in the context of a claim by a
sole proprietor that the compelled production of his business
records infringed upon his Fifth Amendment rights. 5 9 Any
protection claimed on the basis of the content of the documents
was rejected. 60 Thus, the question left open in Fisher, whether
privately held business records were protected by the Fifth
61
Amendment, was answered negatively in United States v. Doe.
The Court characterized the business records as less personal than
the tax records in Fisher62 which were not protected and further
stated "if the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has
voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and
the contents of the document are not privileged." 63
The argument over the protection afforded by the Fifth
Amendment to the contents of private papers was hardly over. 64
Justice O'Connor, in a separate concurrence to Doe, stated flatly
that "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for
the contents of private papers of any kind." 65 Chastising Justice
O'Connor for her eagerness to declare the Boyd doctrine dead,
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote separately to
note that the decision in Doe rested on the act of production and
did not explicitly rule on the contents argument. 66 Justice
Stevens, in yet another separate opinion, also expressed his view
that the contents argument was dispositive in Doe.67
"Nonetheless, Fisher, Andresen, and Doe clearly signal that
Boyd, at best, must be read in a very limited fashion."68
58. In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Andresen, 427
U.S. 463).

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104 (1988).
In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecun, I F.3d at 92.
In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d at 530.
Doe, 465 U.S at 612 n.10.

64. Will, supra note 11, at 981.

65. Doe, 465 U.S at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 618 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
67. Id. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
68. In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d at 530.
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The opinions of the circuit courts since Doe have split on the
issue of protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the
contents of any documents. 69 Four of the circuits have concluded

that no document, personal or business, is protected if it is
voluntarily prepared. 70 Four others remain undecided on the
extent of protection afforded private papers. 7 1 Three remaining

circuits continue to recognize some Fifth Amendment protection
based on the contents of the document. 72 While it is possible that
73
one's private diary will be protected from public scrutiny,
depending on which circuit the action arises in, the contents of
74
one's business records will receive no such protection. Until
the Supreme Court definitively rules that the contents of a
document are immaterial for granting the privilege of Fifth
Amendment protection, there remains no certain answer to the
dilemma faced by a defendant seeking to protect his private
papers from scrutiny.
That the owner of a sole proprietorship may seek Fifth
Amendment protection for the contents of subpoenaed material on
69. Will, supra note 11, at 984.
70. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir.
1993) (noting that the Second, Fourth, Ninth and D.C. Circuit Courts have
concluded that no document, personal or business, is protected if it is
voluntarily prepared and holding that contents of voluntarily prepared private
papers are not privileged), cert. denied sub nom., Doe v. United States, 510
U.S. 1091 (1994); United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1991)
(finding contents of appointment books not privileged), aff'd after remand sub
nom.; United States v. Stone, 976 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507
U.S. 1029 (1993); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(finding that the contents of voluntarily prepared records, including personal
ones, are not privileged); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 759 F.2d 1418 (9th
Cir. 1985) (explaining that without a showing of compulsion, contents of
business and personal documents are not privileged).
71. Will, supra note 11, at 984 n.203. The First, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits remain undecided.
72. Id. at 984 n.203. The Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits recognize some
degree of protection based on the Fifth Amendment. See Butcher v. Bailey,
753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 925 (1985); United
States v. Davis, 636 F.2d. 1028 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862
(1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980).
73. Worthy-Bulla, supra note 40, at 337.
74. Andresen, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976).
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the grounds that such documents are incriminating, swims against
the tide of the recent decisions in this area. On the more placid
seas of Boyd, and its acceptance of a zone of privacy protected by
both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, such a stance would have
gained safe harbor. In the more turbulent waters surrounding
Fisher, the privilege might well have been ship-wrecked on any
number of procedural sea mounts. In the wake of Doe, any effort
to invoke the privilege under such circumstances would be akin
to an attempt to turn the tide.
Therefore, the sole-proprietor's attempt to invoke his Fifth
-Amendment privilege based on the contents of the documents
would likely be unsuccessful. Fisher informs us that the focus of
the inquiry into privilege rests on the act of production. 75 Doe
further explains that the records of a sole proprietor are without
privilege in the context of Fifth Amendment challenge. 76 To the
extent that the documents are truly personal, the sole proprietor's
defense would profit from emphasizing the act of production
aspect of self-incrimination.
III. ACT OF PRODUCIONARGUMENT
The Supreme Court, in Fisher, changed the focus of its
approach to Fifth Amendment privilege questions. From the
historical concern of Boyd with the privacy of the contents of
personal or business documents to one that excludes those
contents from protection unless otherwise privileged under a
compelled production theory. 77 The new approach indicates that
the testimonial aspects of the act of producing voluntarily
prepared documents may be privileged. 78 Fisher is significant in
that in addition to its rejection of Boyd,79 it recognizes that
75. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
76. Doe, 465 U.S. at 612.

77. Worthy-Bulla, supranote 40, at 303.
78. Samuel A. Alito, Documents and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination,48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 27 (1986).
79. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409 (stating "the prohibition against forcing the
production of private papers has long been a rule searching for a rationale
consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth Amendment.").
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admissions of authentication, possession, and existence can be
testimonial communication. 80
Boyd, which was never explicitly overturned in any subsequent
decision, extended the privilege against self-incrimination to "any
forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or
of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict
him . . "81 In Fisher, the Court recognized "that compliance
with an [Internal Revenue Service] summons directing the
production of documents would tacitly admit three facts: that the
documents exist, that the summonsee controls or possesses them,
'82
and that they are the documents specified in the summons."
Similarly, in Doe, the Court accepted the findings of both the
District Court83 and the Court of Appeals 84 that the subpoena
issued would compel the admission that the records exist, are
authentic, and are in his possession. 85 Conversely, in Andresen v.
Maryland,86 the seizure of evidence described in a search warrant
did not violate the petitioner's rights because he was not required
to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of the
87
incriminating evidence.
The act of production in Fisher was not found to be
incriminating to the defendant taxpayer. There, the taxpayer,
under investigation for possible civil or criminal liability under
federal income tax laws, transferred certain documents relating to
their accountants' preparation of their tax return to their attorney.
The Internal Revenue Service served a summons on the attorney
80. Brief in Opposition for Respondent at 41, United States v. Doe, 465
U.S. 605 (1984) (No. 82-786) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
81. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.

82. Hunt, supra note 32, at 811-12 (citing Fisher,425 U.S. at 410).
83. In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 3
(D.N.J. 1981).
84. In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 335 (3d
Cir. 1982).
85. Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 n.ll (citing In re Grand Jury Empanelled March
19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. at 3).
86. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 463.
87. Id. at 475 (analogizing the seizure of evidence pursuant to a search

warrant to the petitioner's right against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment).
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directing that the records be produced. The attorney refused,
claiming "that enforcement would involve compulsory selfincrimination of the taxpayers ... and would violate [the right
of] the taxpayers... to communicate in confidence with their
attorney." 8 8 The taxpayer intervened and made similar claims.
The Court affirmed the findings below in holding that the
taxpayers' privilege under the Fifth Amendment was "not
violated by the enforcement of the summonses." 89 The privilege
attaches only when a person is compelled to be a witness against
himself. Here, because the taxpayer was not compelled to
produce the documents himself, "the ingredient of personal
compulsion against [the] accused is lacking."90 Additionally,
even the taxpayers' own production of these documents would
have "minimal testimonial significance" 9 1 because "the existence
and location of the papers" were well known and the fact that the
defendant had possession of them added little to the
92
Government's information.
The Court reached the opposite conclusion regarding the act of
production in Doe. There, the owner of several sole
proprietorships was served with subpoenas demanding production
of certain business records in connection with an investigation
into corruption in the awarding of municipal contracts. 93 Doe
88. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 395 (finding that a violation of the taxpayers'
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures was also
claimed).
89. Id. at 397.
90. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973).
91. Fisher,425 U.S. at 412.
92. Id. at411.
93. Doe, 465 U.S. at 607. The Doe Court set forth broad categories of
records sought by the subpoena:

general ledgers; general journals; cash disbursement journals; petty
cash books and vouchers; purchase journals; vouchers; paid bills:

invoices; cash receipts journal; billings; bank statements; canceled
checks and checkstubs; payroll records; contracts and copies of
contracts, including all retainer agreements; financial statements;
bank deposit tickets; retained copies of partnership income tax
returns; retained copies of payroll tax returns; accounts payable
ledger; accounts receivable ledger; telephone company statement of
calls and telegrams, and all telephone toll slips; records of all
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sought to quash the subpoenas in District Court. 94 The motion
was granted to the extent that all records not required to be kept
by law were deemed protected by the privilege. The court found
that the act of production had communicative aspects which

warranted Fifth Amendment protection. 95
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the holding below,
endorsing the view that the act of production would compel Doe

to admit to the existence of the records, affirm his possession of
the records, and authenticate that the records are those described

in the subpoenas. Additionally, it noted that the government had
failed to show that it knew, as a certainty, that each of the

96
documents demanded of Doe was in his control or possession,

as distinguished from the situation in Fisherwhere the possession
of the records sought was held insignificant. Further, the
Government was in effect asking Doe to furnish the "missing
link" in its evidentiary chain by demanding information which
would show that he operates the businesses and controls the bank
accounts. 97 These findings were accepted by the Supreme Court,
which held that the record supported the decision reached. 98
escrow, trust, or fiduciary accounts maintained on behalf of clients;
safe deposit box records; records of all purchases and sales of all
stocks and bonds; names and home addresses of all partners,
associates, and employees; W-2 forms of each partner, associate,
and employee; workpapers; and copies of tax returns.
Id. at 607 n. 1.
94. In re GrandJury Empanelled, 541 F. Supp. at 2.
95. Id.
96. In re GrandJury Empanelled, 680 F.2d at 335.
97. Id. at 335 n. 12 ("It is precisely this sort of expedition that the fifth
amendment traditionally has been interpreted to prevent."). Id. at 336.
98. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614. New York State, in a case closely paralleling
Doe, held that the act of production would compel a sole practitioner to
incrimiiate himself. See Henry v. Lewis, 102 A.D.2d 430, 478 N.Y.S.2d 263
(Ist Dep't 1984). In Lewis, the psychiatrist-defendant sought to quash a
subpoena compelling the production of medical and office records for an
investigation into possible insurance fraud. Id. at 430-31, 478 N.Y.S.2d at
265. The court found that the contents of the records were not protected, but
that production of the records would admit their existence, their possession by
defendant and would verify their identification as the records sought. Id. at
434, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The court, therefore, ordered the subpoena
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The essential elements in any claim of Fifth Amendment
privilege

include the testimonial nature of the statement,

compulsion, and incrimination. Questions of whether averments
of the defendant or summonsee are testimonial vel non defy easy
categorization. Their resolution will probably rely on the
particular circumstances of the case at bar. 99 However, the result
of that characterization will determine the outcome of the
defendant's claim. If the statements are not found to be
testimonial, but only attest to some factual or physical evidence,
the defendant will not be successful in his claim and will
subsequently be forced to testify.
Courts have held that evidence which merely incriminates, but
otherwise contains no testimonial statement, passes constitutional

muster.100 The privilege protects the witness only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. 101
quashed to the extent that it required production of these records. Id. at 437,
478 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
99. Fisher,425 U.S. at 410.
100. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 757, 761 (1966). In Schmerber,
petitioner was subjected to blood withdrawal and a chemical analysis after
being involved in a motor vehicle accident despite his objection to the test. Id.
at 758-59. After a chemical analysis of the blood sample revealed that
petitioner had "a percent by weight" of alcohol in his blood at the time of the
[accident], petitioner was arrested and charged with the "criminal offense of
driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Id.
Petitioner argued against the admissibility of the chemical analysis on the
ground that the circumstance under which the blood was drawn and the
admission of the chemical analysis into evidence violated "his privilege against
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 759. However, the
Court rejected petitioner's argument finding that his "testimonial capacities
were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was
irrelevant to the results of test, which depend[ed] on chemical analysis and on
that alone." Id. at 765. Thus, the Court determined that petitioner's right
against self-incrimination was not violated even though the chemical analysis
was "an incriminating product of compulsion... since the blood test
evidence ... was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some
communicative act or writing by the petitioner." Id.
101 People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256, 261, 247 N.E.2d 651, 654, 299
N.Y.S.2d 830, 834 (1969). The New York courts, mirroring the federal
courts, hold the privilege applicable only to testimonial or communicative
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Compulsion which makes the witness the source of factual or
physical evidence does not violate the privilege. 102 Therefore,
the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause only protects
individuals from having assertions which convey information,
explicitly or implicitly, about their knowledge and state of mind
compelled by their own acts. 10 3 Whenever a response requires
that a suspect communicate an assertion of fact or belief, he or
she faces the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or
contempt" and thus offers testimonial evidence. 104
Compelling a witness to testify affords the witness protection
under the Fifth Amendment if it is invoked. In order to ensure
that the defendant's right against compelled self-incrimination is
not compromised, the court must determine whether the act of
production itself would be testimonial. 10 5 Upon an affirmative
finding in that inquiry, the court must then choose measures
which may be employed to protect the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights. One such measure is the granting of the
defendant's request for a motion to quash the order compelling
production or testimony, as did the district court in Doe. 106
Another approach would be to require a grant of immunity from
prosecution issued by the court or the prosecutor. 107
Immunity is a rational compromise between the legitimate
demands of the prosecution to compel citizens to testify and the
right of those citizens not to be compelled to indict

evidence provided by the defendant himself. Id. (citing Schnerber, 384 U.S.
at 761).
102. Id. at 764.
103. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 122.
104. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990).
105. Robert Marshall Heier, Note, Books and Records and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 33 BROOK. L. REV. 70, 73 (1966). Among the
methods employed to permit judicial inspection of records while preserving
their secrecy are presenting the documents in a sealed envelope to the judge
and presenting photostatic copies of the records with the incriminatory portions
removed. Id. at 73-74.
106. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
107. Doe, 465 U.S. at 616.
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themselves. 10 8 Immunity statutes were adopted as a response to
the needs of the government to require its citizens to bear witness
in the investigation of crime and have been characterized as
essential to the enforcement of various criminal statutes. 109
Recognition that the privilege against self-incrimination did not
apply when immunity had been granted came soon after the
privilege itself was recognized. 110
The government in Doe argued that Doe's act of production
would not be used against him in any way, negating any
contention on his part that his testimony would be
incriminating. 111 Doe had refused to produce the requested
documents, despite the government's averments, on the grounds

that without a formal grant there was no indication of the extent
of immunity. 112 The government countered that Doe, in claiming

a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege, had left the government
with a choice of granting an overly broad immunity to which he
was not entitled or granting no immunity at all. Instead, it urged
the court itself to grant Doe the necessary immunity. 113 The

district court declined the invitation, as did both the Third Circuit
and the Supreme Court.
Compelling a witness to give testimony is not the only source
of the prosecutor's obligation to refrain from using the testimony
against the witness. The obligation may also arise at part of an
immunity agreement in which the witness provides the
information in exchange for a promise from the prosecutor not to
use it against him, known as "use immunity," or not to prosecute
108. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972) reh'g denied, 408
U.S. 931 (1972). In Kastigar, the district court ordered petitioner to answer
questions under the grant of immunity when petitioners were likely to assert
their Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 442. The issue was whether the United
States government may compel testimony from an unwilling witness by
conferring immunity upon him or her. Id. The Court held that immunity is
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of one's Fifth Amendment
privilege. Id. at 453.

109. Id. at 447.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Doe, 465 U.S. at 616.
Respondent's Brief, supra note 80.
In re Grand Jury Empanelled, 680 F.2d at 337.
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A grant

of immunity cannot supplant the claimed Fifth Amendment
privilege, but must be at least coextensive with the privilege in

order to be held adequate. 115 A statute which leaves the witness
subject to prosecution for the offense to which he has testified
116
fails to meet the requirements of the Constitution.

Immunity from prosecution based on an assertion of Fifth
Amendment privilege is currently provided for in Title 18 U.S.C.
sections 6002117 and 6003.118 Until section 6002 was enacted in
114. United States v. Eliason, 3 F.3d 1149, 1152 (7th Cir. 1993).
115. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 450.
116. Id. at 450-451.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1996). Section 6002 provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a
proceeding before or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States...
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the
witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse
to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled
under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony or other information) may be used against the
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the
order.
Id.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1996). § 6003 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to
testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or
ancillary to a court of the United States or a grand jury of the
United States, the United States district court for the judicial district
in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance
with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United
States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual
to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to
give or provide on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, such order to become effective as provided in
sections 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant
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1970, the various federal immunity statutes endorsed the use of

transactional immunity. 119 Ruling on the constitutionality of
section 6002 in Kastigar,the Court considered the relative merits
120
of transactional and use immunities.
A witness afforded transactional immunity would be assured
that his or her compelled testimony could in no way lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties. 12 1 Thus, the prosecution would
be barred from charging the witness on any matter related to the
compelled testimony. Arguments that transactional immunity

provided more protection than was constitutionally required
centered on the fact that a witness who was granted such

immunity received a greater amount of protection than a person
whose testimony had merely been coerced. 122 The witness whose
testimony had been coerced would still be liable for criminal
prosecution if the evidence he or she provided could be verified
through other sources. Thus, leads which develop as a result of
the coerced testimony, the "fruits" of the testimony, may
uncover evidence which would subject the witness to

prosecution. 123
Attorney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this
section when in his judgment(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be
necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or
provide other information on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination.
Id. (emphasis added)
119. New York State, in contrast, has retained transactional immunity for
witnesses compelled to give testimony by an offer of immunity. N.Y. CRIi.
PROC. L. §50.10 (McKinney 1992).
120. Kastigar,406 U.S. 441 (1973).
121. Id. at 466 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 461. Transactional immunity affords the witness absolute
immunity from prosecution for any offense related to the testimony. Id. at 453.
In contrast, a witness may be prosecuted through the use of evidence gathered
independently of her coerced testimony. Id. at 461.
123. Id. at 466 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see United States v. Washington,
860 F. Supp. 479 (N.D.m. 1994) (stating "[tihe fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine... derives from the Fourth Amendment and mandates the exclusion
of evidence secured as a result of unlawful searches and seizures." The
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Use immunity provides a narrower band of protection for the
compelled witness in that he or she is protected against
prosecution only for the precise testimony given. As in the case
of the coerced witness, leads from that testimony may be pursued
and used later to convict him. 124 Derivative use immunity
requires that any direct or indirect evidence derived from the
12 5
testimony is inadmissible in future prosecutions of the witness.
In Kastigar, the Court endorsed the constitutionality of use
immunity with respect to 18 U.S.C. section 6002, finding that
immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the
126
scope of the privilege provided by the Fifth Amendment.
Under 18 U.S.C. section 6003, the court is required to grant
immunity when it is requested by the prosecution. 127 However,
without a request by the U.S. Attorney, the statute does not grant
that authority to the court. 12 8 In Doe, "the Government never
made a statutory request [for] immunity," instead urging the
court "to adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity." 129 In
affirming the decision below, the Supreme Court declined to
extend the jurisdiction of the courts to prospective grants of
immunity without a request from the government. 130 Noting that
the decision to seek use immunity requires a balancing of the
government's interest in obtaining information and the risk that
without immunity the prosecution of the subject of their
investigation may be jeopardized, the Court found that Congress
had expressly left this decision to the Justice Department. 131
Title 18 U.S.C. sections 6002 and 6003, as federal statutes,
necessarily apply only to the federal court system. However, each
state has analogous statutes providing for the granting of either
doctrine applies in situations where a constitutional right has been violated,
where there is a "poisonous tree." Moreover, the doctrine has been applied to
violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.) Id. at 482.
124. Id. at 466-67 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 441.
126. Id. at 453.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See 18 U.S.C. § 6003.
Doe, 465 U.S. at 616.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 616-617.
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transactional or use immunity. 13 2 Additionally, the federal
government is mandated to recognize the grant of immunity
provided by states to the accused, as the states are mandated to
recognize the immunity grants of both the federal government
and its' sister states.
Without any indication that the government has information
which would tend to render the sole proprietor's act of
production insignificant, it will have difficulty showing that the
testimonial element of his production is lacking. To the extent
that the records are lawfully required to be kept, the act of
production is merely factual and not privileged under the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. Because the documents
were in existence before the subpoena was issued, she has no
argument that their assembly was compelled. A grant of
immunity from prosecution would also remove the element of
incrimination from the calculus the court must undertake to
determine whether the testimony is privileged. However, the
likelihood that the government is more interested in her
testimony, than in her conviction, is remote.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of the likelihood of a particular defendant
prevailing on a Fifth Amendment claim of privilege must
consider several important variables. Primarily, since the
Supreme Court has yet to rule decisively, a consideration of the
question of content bears mentioning. Until the Court rules on the
issue, vestiges of the Boyd doctrine will remain. The split in the
circuit courts regarding the applicability of Boyd, in light of
Fisher and Doe, reflects the role chance and geography will play
in any informed discussion of a defendants' prospects. 133 Justice
O'Connor's epitaph for Boyd' 34 appears to have been delivered
prematurely.
Proceeding to an act of production analysis, several
factors must be examined: the testimonial nature of the
132. Kastigar,406 U.S. at 447.
133. See supra notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
134. Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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production, the voluntariness vel non of the documents'
assembly, the presence of a compelling force, and the nature of
the evidence. 135 Again, the circuit courts are not in agreement on
their application of the standards for each of these categories. In
the face of irreconcilable court decisions, the attorney
representing a defendant in a self-incrimination case has few
reliable guideposts. Her or his task is therefore encumbered by
the Supreme Courts' failure, thus far, to define the parameters of
the privilege in a meaningful way. Such an attorney may be
better able to state definitively when the privilege does not apply
rather than when it does.
Raymond G. Keenan

135. See Hunt, supra note 32, at 804-814.
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